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The war pitting the United States and Israel against Iran is far from over. Yet defense planners and militaries are already feverishly pulling lessons from the campaign. Experts are asking two central questions: why haven’t the U.S. and its partners—equipped with the world’s most advanced weapons and overwhelming firepower—forced Iran to back down? And how has Iran preserved its ability to strike back despite sustaining heavy damage? At a basic level, analysts point to Iran’s asymmetric arsenal—ballistic missiles, drones and naval mines—as effective complements to, and in some cases substitutes for, traditional platforms such as aircraft, tanks and surface combatants. “Asymmetric” here means unconventional, relatively low-cost systems that let a weaker actor achieve mass effects or surprise with relatively small numbers.
Focusing only on the weapons themselves, however, misses the deeper lesson of this Middle East campaign. By late March—about three weeks into the fighting—gaps began appearing in Israel’s air defenses. Suicide drones and missiles struck across downtown Tel Aviv, inflicting notable damage. Dimona, the southern desert city that hosts nuclear facilities, was also hit and some 200 people were reported injured. This was not primarily because Iran’s missiles and drones were so technically superior that they punched through Israel’s layered defenses known as the Iron Dome.
The problem was quantity. Iran launched hundreds of drones along with cruise and ballistic missiles in a single night. Israel could not meet every incoming threat with interceptor missiles that cost millions of dollars apiece. Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—equipped with advanced U.S. systems like THAAD and Patriot—suffered similarly not because their interceptors failed mechanically, but because waves of low-cost missiles and drones exhausted their stocks of interceptors.
James Black, a European defense-policy analyst at RAND Europe, warns that cost asymmetry has migrated from the tactical to the strategic level. A Shahed drone costs roughly $30,000 (about 44 million KRW). The U.S. typically counters each one with an interceptor that costs on the order of $4 million (about 5.9 billion KRW). Iran has reportedly got production capacity on the order of 10,000 Shaheds per month. By comparison, Lockheed Martin’s Patriot (PAC-3) production is measured in the hundreds—around 600 missiles per year. That fundamental cost imbalance is reshaping the paradigm of war. Linda Bilmes at Harvard’s Kennedy School estimates that a U.S. campaign against Iran could cost at least $1 trillion (about 1,480 trillion KRW). Low-cost Iranian missiles and drones are straining the finances and defense supply chains of the U.S. and Israel.
Observers also have a point when they say the limits of precision-guided munitions are becoming clear. When an opponent fields hundreds or thousands of cheap platforms, sheer precision can lose strategic value. In conflicts of this type, resilience—how quickly a force can absorb losses and sustain operations—can be the decisive factor. Iran’s decentralized command-and-control arrangements, developed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to blunt attempts to decapitate its leadership, along with dispersed ordnance production facilities hidden in rugged terrain and urban areas, have increased the survivability of its forces.
This conflict should set off warning lights for U.S. allies in Northeast Asia. The distance from the Demilitarized Zone to Seoul and the greater capital area is only about 40–50 km (25–31 miles), and Korea’s narrow north–south profile leaves little time to detect and respond to provocations. For decades, North Korea has built up long-range artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems and short-range missiles designed to paralyze the capital region quickly. Pyongyang is unlikely to ignore cost-effective systems such as drones. Importantly, North Korean forces have gained real combat experience with drone operations in Ukraine, where unmanned systems have proved a game-changer. Intelligence reports have also suggested large drone-manufacturing facilities in Guseong, North Pyongan Province—an allegation that gained attention after Unification Minister Jeong Dong-yeong’s comments about nuclear enrichment sites. By contrast, South Korea currently lacks robust domestic drone production and remains dependent on Chinese components and materials. Research and operational testing on military drones in the South is still in early stages.
Establishing a reliable kill chain to counter North Korea’s increasingly sophisticated nuclear and missile threats remains essential. But the character of war is shifting, and doctrine must follow. South Korea’s armed forces still appear focused on high-performance, high-precision systems. North Korea, by contrast, has internalized the importance of cost-asymmetric warfare and is quickly adapting those concepts into strategy, tactics and doctrine. Seoul’s government and military have been slow to respond. Without a sharper sense of urgency, South Korea risks repeating the same mistakes that have hampered the U.S. and Israel.
Bae Byung-woo, Editorial Writer
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