US Navy’s Golden Fleet Revival: Can MASGA and RDP-A Solve Supply Chain Challenges?

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[Yang Chan, Senior Researcher at the Defense Industry Policy Center of the Korea Defense Industry Association] The U.S. Navy’s massive project to revive battleship construction after half a century, known as the “Trump-class battleship,” is taking shape. Notably, estimates suggest that the construction cost of the first ship, ‘USS Defiant,’ could reach up to $22 billion (approximately 32 trillion KRW).

The Golden Fleet concept, proposed by the Trump administration, is a political and strategic vision aimed at swiftly restoring the U.S. Navy’s aging fleet and rebuilding overwhelming naval power. Rather than being a specific official document, it’s a symbolic expression of the intent to elevate naval strength back to its golden era through large-scale ship construction and maintenance. However, the key is speed. The goal is to increase the number of ships as quickly as possible and restore operational rates to reorganize naval power, but this concept has revealed fundamental limitations in its implementation phase. There was a more challenging task than increasing the number of ships. The shipbuilding and equipment industry base, which was supposed to continuously maintain, repair, and support these ships, had already been structurally weakened.

Currently, major U.S. shipyards, including the Philly Shipyard, are in a state close to collapse of the industrial ecosystem that can stably supply equipment to complete and maintain ship hulls, rather than the ability to construct the hulls themselves.

The crisis in U.S. naval power is no longer an abstract warning. Ship maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) are falling behind schedule, new ship construction timelines are repeatedly delayed, and the shipbuilding industry and equipment supply chain meant to support these efforts are showing structural vulnerabilities. In this context, the U.S. has been seeking new solutions to restore naval power, resulting in the strategic concept from Korea known as MASGA (Make American Shipbuilding Great Again). This approach aims to actively integrate the industrial capabilities of allied nations into maintaining and expanding naval power.

However, MASGA doesn’t work on declaration alone. There’s a crucial institutional foundation necessary to turn this concept into an actionable reality. The core of this is the U.S.-Korea Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDP-A). Often referred to as the FTA of the defense sector, the RDP-A aims to promote defense cooperation and trade with signatory countries by providing a fair competitive environment through the reduction of defense trade barriers. RDP-A is the only solution to make MASGA a reality.

◇Practical Constraints Revealed by the Shiloh MRO Case

Within this structural understanding, the strategy chosen by Korea is MASGA (Maintenance and Sustainment Global Alliance). It’s an approach to restructure the U.S. Navy’s power maintenance and repair system by utilizing the industrial capabilities of its ally, Korea. The direction is realistic. However, MASGA also cannot function without an institutional framework.

The recent case of U.S. Navy Shiloh’s MRO performed by Hanwha Ocean clearly demonstrates this. Korean shipyards had everything: large docks, skilled workforce, and experience in warship maintenance. There were no issues with technology or facilities. Nevertheless, the MRO of U.S. ships in Korea wasn’t as efficient as expected. This was because critical parts and equipment had to be sourced from the U.S. mainland. Approval processes and logistics movements inevitably took time as they overlapped. In other words, under the current structure, even if a U.S. ship undergoes MRO in Korea, there’s the inconvenience of having to bring many critical parts and equipment from the U.S. mainland.

The essence of this case is clear. It’s not about MRO capability, but about institutional frameworks. While maintenance is carried out in Korea, procurement remains tied to U.S. systems. Unless this structure is resolved, MASGA will keep the industrial capacity of the alliance at the level of ‘potential’ rather than an ‘utilisable asset’.

If the RDP-A is concluded, this structure fundamentally changes. By recognizing defense equipment and shipbuilding-related parts produced in Korea as allied procurement, local sourcing becomes possible. This leads to shorter MRO periods, cost reductions, and improved power availability. It’s at this point that MASGA’s goal of ‘fast and flexible naval power maintenance’ is finally realized.

◇RDP-A and SOSA: The Institutional Foundations for MASGA’s Operation

The situation is no different in the field of ship construction. Major U.S. shipyards, including the Philly Shipyard, face a more fundamental problem of weakened equipment supply base rather than hull construction capacity itself. With the ecosystem capable of stably producing and supplying key equipment and parts not being sufficiently maintained, construction schedule delays and cost increases are recurring.

In this situation, attempting to procure all equipment domestically in the U.S. is not realistic. Instead, it’s resulting in simultaneous deterioration of time and costs. On the other hand, Korea has already proven its competitiveness in the global shipbuilding equipment sector. It has an efficient supply chain in terms of quality, delivery, and cost, and is familiar with defense standards through experience in warship construction.

If Korean-made equipment can be legally and stably utilized through the RDP-A, U.S. shipyards can resolve supply issues, and construction efficiency will greatly improve. This is not simply an expansion of imports, but a strategic combination of allied industrial capabilities.

In addition, the practical activation of the already concluded U.S.-Korea Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue (SCCD) is important. The SCCD is an agreement to manage supply chains in strategic industries such as semiconductors, energy, and defense at the security level, and to cooperate in times of crisis. However, currently, the SCCD remains at a declarative level in the shipbuilding and MRO sectors.

If the RDP-A opens the door to procurement, the SCCD is a safeguard that continuously ensures supply chain stability. When these two systems are combined, Korea’s shipbuilding and equipment industry becomes not a short-term complement but a structural component of allied naval power. Especially during the transition period until the Philly Shipyard normalizes, strategically utilizing Korean equipment is not a temporary measure but the only realistic option.

◇Policy and Strategic Decisions Needed… Realization of U.S. Golden Fleet Concept Possible

It’s anachronistic to understand the RDP-A simply as an agreement for mutual purchase of defense materials. Today, shipbuilding and naval MRO are recognized as security infrastructure beyond industry. Like semiconductors and energy, the stability and reliability of the supply chain have become directly linked to national security.

In this context, the RDP-A is the core infrastructure that enables MASGA to function. It provides the U.S. with the speed to recover naval power, and offers Korea an opportunity to elevate the strategic status of its shipbuilding and defense industries. Furthermore, at the alliance level, it enables a new security model that integrates industrial capabilities as part of military power.

The RDP-A is not an agreement that can be concluded by declaration alone. Generally, it goes through stages of initiating policy consultations, reviewing procurement systems and legal consistency, assessing industrial impact, concluding inter-governmental agreements, and establishing practical implementation systems. This is not a technical issue but a matter of policy and strategic decision.

Korea has already proven its shipbuilding and defense capabilities, and the U.S. has a clear strategic need to restore naval power. A realistic institutional framework is needed to support the Golden Fleet concept. MASGA is a strategic evolution that recognizes this reality. And the starting point for turning this strategy into reality is the practical operation of the RDP-A and the SCCD. What’s needed now is not further explanation, but decision. MASGA should not be a concept, but a strategy. And that strategy is completed through institutions.

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